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Cryptographic Key Generation from Biometric Data Using Lattice Mapping
Gang Zheng, Wanqing Li and Ce Zhan
School of Information Technology and Computer Science
University of Wollongong, Australia
{gz207, wanqing, cz847}@uow.edu.au
Abstract
Crypto-biometric systems are recently emerging as an effective process of key management to address the security
weakness of conventional key release systems using passcodes, tokens or pattern recognition based biometrics. This
paper presents a lattice mapping based fuzzy commitment
method for cryptographic key generation from biometric
data. The proposed method not only outputs high entropy
keys, but also conceals the original biometric data such
that it is impossible to recover the biometric data even when
the stored information in the system is open to an attacker.
Simulated results have demonstrated that its authentication
accuracy is comparable to the well-known k-nearest neighbour classiﬁcation.

1. Introduction
Cryptographic systems have been widely used to secure information. Whether a symmetric cipher system or a
public-key system, its security depends on the secrecy of the
secret or private key. Traditional passcode or token based
key release systems are not secure and convenient enough
for ever increased security requirements of many applications since passcodes and tokens are easy to be forgotten,
lost or stolen. Crypto-biometric system [11, 8] has recently
been emerging as an effective means to address these issues faced by traditional passcode or token based systems.
It intends to bind a cryptographic key with user’s biometric information in a manner to meet the following requirements [4, 3, 8] of distortion tolerance, discrimination and
security.
• Distortion tolerance is the ability to accommodate the
variance of the biometrics. The system is expected to
output the same key for the same user even if the biometrics is acquired at different time or under different
conditions.
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• Discrimination is the ability of the system to distinguish all users of the system and output different keys
for different users.
• Security of the system means that neither the key, nor
the user’s original biometric information can be extracted or calculated when the stored information is
compromised.
In general, there are two approaches to binding a cryptographic key with biometrics. One is biometric-based key
release [11] where the key is hidden into a biometric template during enrollment and is released during authentication. A typical key release system [11, 1] employs a similar
strategy to UNIX login password where a one-way hash of
the biometric template is stored and the authentication is
conducted in the hashing space.
The other is biometric-based key generation [11] in
which the key is calculated directly from the biometric information. One of the main challenges in this approach is to
maintain the entropy of the key and keep the security of the
biometric information simultaneously. This paper is about
a new cryptographic key generation method.

1.1. Related work
A handful of papers has been published so far in the
area of key generation from biometric data. The proposed
methods generally fall into two categories: error-correcting
code [12] based and Shamir’s key sharing scheme [7] based.
In error-correcting code scheme, codewords and decoding functions are established from the biometric templates
during the enrollment. The codeword or its hash value
can be used either as a key or as a seed to a key generator. At the authentication stage, the biometric data
is used to compute or retrieve the codeword. Typical
error-correcting code based key generation methods are
Juels’ Fuzzy Commitment Scheme [4] and Fuzzy Vault
Scheme [3], Dodis’s Fuzzy Extractor [2] and Soutar’s Bioscript for ﬁngerprints [8].

Shamir’s key sharing scheme [7] provides another avenue to bind a key with biometric data. In this scheme,
biometric data is ﬁrst transformed into a binary sequence.
During enrollment, the binary sequences of biometric templates are employed to generate the shares of a key. During authentication, binary sequences from the biometric
data forms the knowledge (shares) of the key. Monrose
et al. [6, 5] ﬁrst employed this scheme to harden a password with keystroke dynamics [6] and then extended it to
generate a key from voice [5]. Teoh et al. [10, 9] proposed a method to generate a key from ﬁngerprints [10] and
faces [9] by projecting features to a randomly selected orthogonal space.
Both schemes require the transformation from biometric
data into binary sequences. This transform is critical not
only to the accuracy of the authentication, but also the entropy of the generated keys.

1.2. Contributions of the paper
Following the principle of Juels’ fuzzy commitment
scheme and K-nearest neighbourhood (K-NN) classiﬁcation, we propose in this paper a new method for key generation from biometric data by employing a set of error tolerant
lattice functions to map biometric data from feature space
into lattice spaces. The method does not require the original biometric data to be stored. Instead, it stores the lattice
functions for the templates acquired during the enrollment.
Original biometric features are not recoverable even the lattice functions are compromised. The method is generic and
applicable to all types of biometric data with a comparable
performance to K-nearest neighbour (K-NN) classiﬁcation.

2. Lattice Mapping Based Fuzzy Commitment
2.1. Fuzzy Commitment Scheme [4]
Formally an n-bit commitment scheme consists of a
function F : {0, 1}n × X → Y . To commit an n-bit codeword c, the sender chooses a witness x ∈ X , generally uniformly at random. The sender then computes y = F (c, x),
known as a bolb. It represents that the n-bit c is sealed in
a ”safe”. To ”open” or decommit the bolb y and produce
the codeword c, it requires witness x. Notice that an n-bit
witness x can be uniquely expressed in terms of the codeword (committed value) c along with an offset δ ∈ {0, 1}n
such that x = c + δ. The idea behind fuzzy commitment
is to conceal c using a conventional hash function h, while
leaving δ in the clear. The information δ provides tolerance in the witness required to open F . In particular, δ only
provides partial information about x and the remaining information to specify x, namely the codeword c, is presented
in a concealed form h(c).
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Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l be a hash (one-way)
function, such as SHA-1. F : ({0, 1}n , {0, 1}n ) →
({0, 1}l , {0, 1}n ) can be deﬁned as follows:
F (c, x) = (h(c), x − c).

(1)


To decommit F (c, x) = (α, δ) using witness x , the receiver computes c = f (x − δ) = f (c + (x − x)). If
α = h(c ), then it has been successfully decomitted, with c
being the extracted commitment. Otherwise, x is an incorrect witness. Here f (·) is a decoding function.
In the context of key generation from biometric data, a
user, U , presents biometric data x during enrollment. The
system randomly selects a codeword c as the key or a seed
to a key generator from a set C ⊆ {0, 1}n of codewords,
computes the fuzzy commitment yU = F (c, x) and stores
it in a ﬁle for U . At authentication, a user purporting to be
U presents biometric data x . The system looks up yU and
check whether x yields a successful decommitment. If so,
the decommited c is the key or the seed to a key generator.
As seen from Equation 1, application of the fuzzy commitment scheme to a particular biometric data requires a
transformation of the biometric data from its feature space
into a binary sequence, a proper selection of the codewords
and the decoding function f (·). Selection of the codewords
decides the entropy of the key whereas the binary transformation and selection of decoding function will determine
the authentication accuracy of the system. Though Juels [4]
mathematically formulated the fuzzy commitment scheme
with explanatory examples, no speciﬁcation has been given
for the selection of codewords and the decoding function.
In the next section, we present a fuzzy commitment scheme
based on a set of lattice functions.

2.2. Lattice Mapping
Let x = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xp ) be a p-dimensional biometric
feature vector and xi ∈ , i = 1, · · · , p. We deﬁne the
codeword c as a p-dimensional vector with each element
being a random binary string. Let c = (s1 , s2 , · · · , sp ),
si ∈R {0, 1}q , i = 1, · · · , p, where ∈R means uniform random selection from a set. We further treat the codeword c
as the coordinate of x in a lattice space, L, mapped from
its real feature space with δ being the half of the lattice grid
size. This lattice space L can then be deﬁned by its origin
O = (o1 , o2 , · · · , op ) and the grid size δ.
oi = xi − δ − 2δ si , i = 1, · · · , p

(2)

With this arrangement, the decoding function f (·) becomes
a simple mapping from x to c using the lattice system
L(O, δ).
c

=

si

=

f (x)


xi − oi
, i = 1, · · · , p
2δ

(3)

where, [·] is an operator taking the integer part of the
input. It can be seen that any biometric data x that lies
within the hypersphere centered at x with radius δ will be
mapped into the same grid (codeword c). In other words, δ
serves as a parameter of distortion tolerance. In addition, it
is impossible to calculate original biometric data x from the
lattice system L(O, δ) and x is not required to decommit c
from x . Therefore, the system only need to store L(O, δ)
and the codeword c and x are secure even when L(O, δ) is
open to an attacker.

3. Cryptographic key generation
3.1. Protocol
Let S denote the cryptographic key generation system
based on the lattice mapping described above, U denote the
user and K be a deterministic algorithm that takes input
as seed and output a corresponding secret/public key pair
(SK, P K). The protocol employing the proposed lattice
mapping based fuzzy commitment is described as follows

ci

=

c
not c

if x − xi  ≤ δ
otherwise

(4)

A proper selection of the tolerance parameter δ will allow more than one ci to be identical to c. A majority vote
will decide which ci should be output by the system S.

4. Simulated results
In this section, we present simulated results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed method. Instead of
using artiﬁcially generated data, we used the well-known
Iris plant data. The data has 3 classes, 4 real numeric attributes and 150 samples, which simulated 3 users.
Figure 1 shows the total authentication error rate of the
proposed method and K-NN at k=7 when different number
of training samples were used. The training samples were
randomly selected from the data set from each class (user)
and the rest of the samples was used as test data. When
δ = 0.7, the proposed method performed comparable to KNN classiﬁcation.

• Enrollment The user U presents biometric data x, the
system S selects a codeword c, then S computes the
origin of the lattice space O using the system parameters δ, and computes the secret key sk = h(c) or the
key pair (SK, P K) = K(c). The system S stores the
lattice system L(O, δ).

6
K−NN (k=7)
δ=0.6
δ=0.7
δ=0.8
δ=0.9

5.5
5
4.5
ERR (%)

• Authentication A user purporting to be U presents a
value of x and decommit c using Equation ( 3). If
successful, she uses c to compute the secret key sk =
h(c ) or as a seed to K to derive (SKU , P KU ).



4
3.5
3
2.5
2

The protocol describes general steps involved in the key
generation and illustrates a special case where only one
training sample of the biometric data is presented at enrollment. In practice, user U is often required to present their
biometric data a few times in order to explore the possible
variations of the biometric data.
Let X = {x1 , x2 , · · · , xm } be the m copies of the
biometric data presented by the user U during enrollment. The system S computes m lattice systems LS =
(Li (O1 , δ), · · · , Lm (Om , δ)) such that all xi , i = 1, · · · , m
will be mapped to the same codeword c. LS is then stored
in the system with respect to U .
During authentication, when a user claiming to be U
presents a copy of their biometric data x , the system S
decommit m copies of c . Let c1 , · · · , cm represent the m
copies of c and ci , ∀i is the decommited value from the
corresponding lattice system L(Oi , δ). Depending on how
far away between x and xi , ci can be either same as c or
different from c.
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Figure 1. Error rate of K-NN classiﬁcation and
authentication by the proposed method at
various values of δ when different number of
training samples are used

Figure 2 shows the ROC of the system as the tolerance δ
varies. The system achieved the best results for the Iris data
set when δ = 0.7
Like all biometric system, selection of the parameter δ
is critical to the performance of the system, since the value
of δ is also a reﬂection of the distribution of the training
samples used in the enrollment. For a real system, the best
performance may be achieved by a proper selection of the

6. Conclusion

3.5

This paper presents a lattice mapping based fuzzy commitment method to compute a cryptographic key from biometric data without revealing the biometric data. The
method not only meet the security requirements, but also
produce comparable accuracy to well-known K-NN classiﬁcation method. Experiments on real biometric data, particular ﬁngerprints and voice, are being conducted and will
be reported in the near future.
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Figure 2. ROC of the proposed system

training samples and selection of δ through statistical analysis of sample distribution.

5. Security analysis
The proposed method is a speciﬁc implementation of
Juels’ fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault scheme [4, 3] using lattice mapping functions with an extension from binary
string x in [4, 3] to x ∈ . Theorems and Lemmas on security proved in [4, 3] are still valid to the proposed method.
Since the codeword c is randomly generated, the security
of the derived key depends on the hashing function h(c) or
the key generator K(c). Many existing hashing and key
generation algorithms can be employed. In addition, the
lattice space depends on the number of bits used for si and
dimension, p, of the biometric features, which can be virtually large, considering that p could be as large as over 200
in voice and thousands in ﬁngerprints and faces. Assume si
is a l-bit string, then c ∈ {0, 1}lp .
Besides the security of the key, the biometric data is
also secure as discussed in Section 2.2. Our system stores
only the lattice mapping parameters L(O, δ), not the original biometric features and it is impossible to calculate the
original biometric feature x from L(O, δ).
The release of δ reveals partial information about x, this
may reduce the entropy of the produced key, however, this
reduction will be small [2].
Finally, users are able to use the same biometric data
to generate different keys for different applications. This
means if one system is compromised, other systems accessed by the same user are still safe.
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